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Abstract 
This paper examines the geographies of Partition through an analysis of the Punjab 
Boundary Commission hearings of July 1947. The paper asks: what happens when 
geographical expertise is transported from ‘the field’ to courtrooms and government offices? 
I argue that geography was transformed, and was managed and limited by the legal 
framework that judged evidence according to its own rules. Examining select records of the 
Punjab Boundary Commission, I argue that the courtroom created certain assumptions about 
the nature and role of evidence in boundary-making negotiations. Rather than applying 
evidence to create a workable boundary, evidence was put to work in often contradictory 
ways in order to lend competing political claims an air of geographical authority. 
Keywords: Boundary, Lahore, Punjab Boundary Commission, Partition, geographical, 
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Introduction 
On 3 June 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India, announced via All India Radio 
that India would be partitioned into two states upon its independence from the Britain. Indian 
representatives in the legislatures in Bengal, Punjab, and certain other provinces in northern 
India where Muslims held majorities would vote on behalf of these Muslim populations to 
decide the fate of the subcontinent: would they be partitioned into two countries, or would 
they choose to join, as single units, one country or the other?1 This was the first stage in 
determining the line of the boundaries, ultimately deciding on behalf of the populations of 
both new states the rough contours of the future borders. Mountbatten proclaimed that in the 
event of a vote in favour of partition in the two largest Muslim-majority provinces, Punjab 
and Bengal, ‘a Boundary Commission [will] be set up by the Governor-General, the 
membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those 
concerned’.2 Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, suggested that the two 
Boundary Commissions should be made up of four Indian members of ‘high judicial 
standing’, nominated by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, and overseen 
by a neutral chairman.3 All parties agreed to the appointment of Cyril Radcliffe, a successful 
and highly-regarded British lawyer, as chairman of the Boundary Commissions. 
This emphasis on legal and judicial expertise, rather than geographical or civil service 
expertise, for composition of the Boundary Commissions is interesting, albeit unsurprising. In 
recent important revisions of Partition history, the specific lack of geographical expertise is 
noted by Lucy Chester, Yasmin Khan, and Joya Chatterji. All point to this particular lacuna 
in the Boundary Commission as one possibility for the particularly spectacular failure of the 
border to function effectively as a means for stemming violence and instigating normal 
diplomatic relations between the two states of Pakistan and India.4 However, this relative 
                                                 
1 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven/London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 2. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Mian Muhammad Sadullah, The Partition of the Punjab, 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents 
(Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983). 
4 Lucy P. Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the 
Partition of Punjab (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Khan, The Great Partition; and 
absence of geographical expertise during the negotiations was in keeping with British 
colonial boundary-making practice. In fact in 1916, the British military geographer, Thomas 
Holdich, who had served the Empire in Central Asia during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, took issue with the fact that judges and politicians were often tasked with 
boundary-making, a job he believed should be done by geographers and surveyors who had 
experience studying and working in the regions of interest.5  
Scholars have noted the importance of geographical concepts such as territory and 
homelands in the study of Partition (including Reece Jones, in his work on the 
territorialisation of Hindu nationalism in pre-Partition Bengal),6 and this paper contributes to 
this literature by highlighting the ways in which the law mediates, sharpens and brings into 
legal existence certain nationalist narratives of territory. However, the paper also analyses the 
role of the legal spaces in which those narratives were relayed in formal negotiations over 
Indian territory. Legal geography makes the case that the space of the courtroom itself is an 
important component of a geographical analysis of the Partition process in India, and an 
appreciation of this space goes some way to explaining how geographical data and 
geographical thinking were positioned, both within the debate and in the final award.7 
However, the process by which geographical data was inserted into the legal framework of 
the two Boundary Commissions was not simply one of subordination, but was a more 
complicated process of collection, selection, consolidation and, crucially, interpretation. 
                                                 
Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 
1947’, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 185–242. 
5 Thomas Hungerford Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (London: Macmillan and 
Co. Limited, 1916). 
6 Reece Jones, ‘Whose Homeland? Territoriality and Religious Nationalism in Pre-Partition Bengal’, 
in South Asia Research, Vol. 26, no. 2 (1 July 2006), pp. 115–31; and Gyanesh Kudaisya, Region, 
Nation, ‘Heartland’: Uttar Pradesh in India’s Body Politic (New Delhi: SAGE Publishing India, 
2006). 
7 Alex Jeffrey, ‘Legal Geography 1: Court Materiality’, in Progress in Human Geography, (December 
2017) doi:10.1177/0309132517747746.  
Scholars including David Delaney, Nicholas Blomley, Irus Braverman and Alexandre Kedar, 
among many others, have developed significant interdisciplinary insights into the loose 
subfield of literature termed legal geographies.8 They acknowledge and probe the ways in 
which geography and law shape each other, how each brings to bear on the other questions 
that are otherwise overlooked. Vera Chouinard writes that geographical concepts can 
illuminate the ways in which the law works, writing: ‘Law is deeply geographic and political: 
shaping people’s territories and access to diverse spaces of living, and perpetuating and 
sometimes challenging lived relations of oppression’.9 ‘Law’s space’, she says, ‘threads its 
way throughout our daily lives’. 10 Similarly, David Delaney notes that ‘attending to the legal 
with greater scrutiny allows researchers to discern how things of interest to geographers 
happen (or fail to happen), and that this can open up fruitful lines of inquiry that foregoing 
the legal forecloses’.11 While this paper is not a legal geography of Partition as such (being 
less concerned with legal interpretations of the key documents and maps associated with the 
final Award), it is concerned with the interactions between geography and the law that the 
partition process created.  
Geographers John Donaldson and Alison Williams note that the practical work of 
boundary commissions is often ultimately understood as legal work, but they remind us that 
                                                 
8 Nicholas K. Blomley and Joel C. Bakan, ‘Spacing Out: Towards a Critical Geography of Law’, in 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 30 (1992), pp. 661–90; Nicholas K. Blomley and Gordon L. Clark, 
‘Law, Theory, and Geography’, in Urban Geography, Vol. 11, no. 5 (1 September 1990), pp. 433–46; 
Nicholas Blomley and Joshua Labove, ‘Law and Geography’, in James D. Wright (ed.), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition) (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), pp. 
474–8; Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney and Alexandre Kedar, The Expanding 
Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); David 
Delaney, ‘Legal Geography I: Constitutivities, Complexities, and Contingencies’, in Progress in 
Human Geography, Vol. 39, no. 1 (1 February 2015), pp. 96–102; and David Delaney, ‘Legal 
Geography II: Discerning Injustice’, in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 40, no. 2 (April 2016), 
pp. 267–74. 
9 Vera Chouinard, ‘Geography, Law and Legal Struggles: Which Ways Ahead?’, in Progress in 
Human Geography, Vol. 18, no. 4 (1 December 1994), p. 430.  
10 Ibid. 
11 David Delaney, ‘Legal Geography I: Constitutivities, Complexities, and Contingencies’, in 
Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 39, no. 1 (1 February 2015), p. 97. 
geographical ideas and practices are deployed in boundary-making processes, and are central 
to arbitrating legal border disputes even if the ‘geography’ of it all is not highlighted. Such 
understandings of bordering have permeated the discipline for at least a century, although the 
problem was usually framed in terms of a perceived correlation between scientific objectivity 
and political neutrality (in crude terms, the more accurate and scientific the survey, the better 
the data, which in turn led to a more trustworthy legal process, which itself engendered a less 
politically-charged solution). In 1916, for example, despite his belief that technical experts 
should be more involved in boundary-making processes, Thomas Holdich insisted that ‘a 
boundary arbitration is always a political function’.12 Around the same time, the American 
geographer and expert in boundary-making, Stephen B. Jones, argued that geographical and 
judicial discourses are deeply intertwined, and their entwining is essential to the delimitation 
stage of boundary-making.13  
Charles Withers and David Livingstone ask, in the introduction to their volume 
Geographies of Nineteenth Century Science, ‘How does science travel—within and between 
communities of practitioners, for example, or from “expert” to “lay” audiences?’14 Or, in this 
case, what effects did the transfer of geographical science from the hands of geographers to 
the desks of legal scholars have on the partition process in the Punjab? The courtroom 
functioned as a ‘venue’, in David Livingstone’s terms, for the production of and debate 
around the legal, political and geographical knowledges that framed the partition process. He 
writes: ‘Here [in the courtroom] decisions are settled about what passes as scientific 
knowledge, how it should be acquired, and the means by which claims are warranted. In these 
                                                 
12 Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making. 
13 Stephen Barr Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary 
Commissioners (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945). 
14 David N. Livingstone and Charles W.J. Withers, Geographies of Nineteenth-Century Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 2. 
venues practitioners absorb the core values, convictions, and conventions of their tradition of 
inquiry’.15  
The history of geography in the colonies, examined by Withers, Edney, Clayton, 
Barrow and others, demonstrates that the proper space of geographical science was a careful 
network composed of unmapped and uncharted territory where engineers and surveyors 
would practise their science, and the cartographer’s studio (from the Survey of India 
headquarters, to British mapmaking outfits such as John Bartholomew’s, based in 
Edinburgh), where mapmakers would construct engraved and lithographed maps from the 
data they received from practitioners in the field.16 This transformed data would then be 
published and disseminated back into the field to be used by colonial officers and scientists in 
the administration and governance of the territory. Such a network construed the practice of 
geography in the colonies as a science conducted in service of the colonial state; by the turn 
of the century, official geography had largely become the science of territorial organisation 
and administration.  
What happens, then, when such geographical expertise is transported from ‘the field’ 
to the very different spaces of courtrooms and government offices, where legal and judicial 
expertise are applied in the assessment of geographical materials? More curiously, what 
happens when the geography of the colonial state is mobilised for the purpose of dismantling 
that same colonial state? I argue in this paper that the courtroom and the legal discourse of 
the boundary commissions transforms geographical data, especially maps, into evidence, and 
                                                 
15 David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientific Knowledge (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 18. 
16 Charles Withers, ‘On Enlightenment’s Margins: Geography, Imperialism and Mapping in Central 
Asia, c.1798–c.1838’, in Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 39, no. n/a (1 January 2013), pp. 3–
18; Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–
1843 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Daniel Clayton, Islands of Truth: The Imperial 
Fashioning of Vancouver Island (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); Ian J. Barrow, Making History, 
Drawing Territory: British Mapping in India, c.1756–1905 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); 
and D. Graham Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El 
Dorado (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
puts that evidence to work in political ways. Geography was not absent in the Boundary 
Commission hearings, but was transformed, and made useful to both the political will of the 
various parties involved and the lawyers and justices who judged such evidence according to 
the rules and norms of the practice of law. 
The rest of this paper will examine in detail select historical records of the Punjab 
Boundary Commission alongside the records of the British geographer Oskar Spate, who was 
best known for his work on Southeast Asia and Fiji, and who was employed as an 
independent advisor to one of the Muslim delegations in the Punjab. Paying close attention to 
maps and geographical arguments, I argue that the courtroom gave rise to certain assumptions 
about the nature and role of evidence, particularly cartographic evidence (presented as maps 
and spatial data), in the context of boundary-making negotiations, and that these assumptions 
shaped not only the final Award, but also the historiography of the high politics of Partition. 
Rather than providing a clear and objective rationale for a specific boundary line, the 
cartographic evidence presented to the Punjab Boundary Commission translated political and 
economic claims into territorial claims, obscuring the geographical questions of units, 
majority populations, and environmental and infrastructure issues. In other words, rather than 
applying evidence for the purpose of creating a workable boundary, the evidence was put to 
work in often contradictory ways in order to lend political claims geographical authority. 
In fact, instead of facilitating the adoption of a universally acknowledged 
representation of the territory at stake, the maps deployed in the courtroom often muddied the 
waters. Competing political claims, couched in the language and visual imagery of objective 
geographical science, were placed before the Boundary Commission on an equal footing and, 
in keeping with the institutional norms and practices of the courtroom, the justices were left 
to adjudicate not only on the relative truth of each claim, but also on the influence that such 
truth should have on the final Award. In other words, the geographical evidence should be 
considered, but its authority should not be considered absolute, especially if it led to a 
recommendation that would be difficult to justify politically. This was especially important 
during the partition process, partly because many claims were made not just on the basis of 
geographical evidence, but also on historical, affective, spiritual and human rights grounds. In 
the case of the Punjab, the geographical evidence on its own happened to support the Muslim 
League claim in most instances, but such evidence was often in competition with these other 
forms of authority.17 The analysis that follows, which examines some of the materials 
presented to the Punjab Boundary Commission, probes the myriad ways in which 
geographical data was collated, articulated and ultimately politicised in the Lahore High 
Court. 
The Punjab Boundary Commission Hearings 
The Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions were formed on 30 June 1947. Each 
commission comprised four Indian judges: in Bengal, two judges were Hindu and two were 
Muslim, while in the Punjab, one judge was Sikh, one was Hindu (both nominated by the 
Congress) and two were Muslim. Radcliffe was also assisted by two secretaries who had been 
members of the Indian Civil Service, Christopher Beaumont and Rao V.D. Ayer. The 
hearings began on Monday 21 July 1947 and were held concurrently in the High Courts of 
Lahore and Calcutta. The Punjab Boundary Commission received fifty-one official claims 
and heard arguments over the course of ten long days. While the official discourse in the 
Punjab was dominated by the concerns of the Muslim League, the Congress and the Sikhs, 
representatives testified on behalf of the Punjab’s Christian communities, the Scheduled 
Castes (Dalits, formerly called ‘untouchables’), the Ahmaddiya community, and others 
                                                 
17 O.H.K. Spate, ‘The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan’, in Geographical Review, Vol. 
38, no. 1 (1 January 1948), pp. 5–29. 
whose interests were deemed by the government to be relevant to the Boundary 
Commission’s deliberations. 
The Congress case was presented by a Parsi lawyer, M.C. Setalvad, while the Muslim 
League case was presented by an Ahmadi lawyer, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. Each case 
was developed by a delegation of members from each side. To build their arguments, they 
gathered as much evidence as they could, drawing on gazetteers, ethnologies and other 
academic sources, government reports, census data, population statistics and maps. Each 
delegation submitted its own memorandum to the Boundary Commission and much of this 
information was made available to the other parties. 
The role of professional geographers (either academic or military) was minimal 
throughout the hearings, although a number of Indian geographers, including Kazi S. Ahmad, 
were involved in the preparation of materials. Interestingly, the geographer Oskar Spate, 
known amongst Anglophone geographers for his significant contributions to regional 
geography and Southeast Asian studies, acted as advisor to the Muslim League in the Punjab 
in advance of and throughout the hearings in Lahore. Spate had been hired by the Ahmaddiya 
community in London to assist the League with devising a geographically robust argument 
for the inclusion of the town of Qadian, their religious and political headquarters, in Pakistan. 
His descriptions of the courtroom, and his views on the limited role of geographical expertise, 
have been cited by a number of historians recently.18 For the most part, however, his diaries 
have been used to set the scene, to describe the atmosphere, and to shore up claims that, had 
the geography been done better, the violence and trauma that accompanied Partition might 
have been mitigated. This paper takes a different approach: Spate’s materials (and, more 
fundamentally, his presence) explicitly demonstrate the ways in which the courtroom 
                                                 
18 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘Divided Landscapes, Fragmented Identities: East Bengal Refugees and Their 
Rehabilitation in India, 1947-79’, in Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 17, no. 1 (1996), 
pp. 24–39; and Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. 
hearings transformed geographical data into evidence, to be applied for the purpose of 
political persuasion. In so doing, Spate’s material is repositioned, functioning less as an 
authoritative voice on the drama of the moment of partition than casting him more as a figure 
of his own time, a demonstration of how evidence and experts are fashioned into tools to be 
wielded by multiple interested and competing parties. 
Yasmin Khan notes that the volume of information submitted to the Boundary 
Commission, and the detailed arguments delivered by each delegation, contributed to 
‘heightened expectations’ among the public.19 Oskar Spate attended some of the hearings (he 
missed some sessions in order to prepare materials for the Muslim League delegation) and 
commented on his observations and experiences in the courtroom. He wrote in his diaries: 
‘Found right court-room by observing concentration of armed police. Gothicy room, fairly 
cool…big dais with shabby royal arms; usual dust and general air of stuffy archives’.20 The 
space was judicial, rather than technical. The maps and supplementary materials that formed 
the basis for the claims were brought to the courtroom from the homes and offices where they 
had been compiled and organised. Many leaders and interested parties attended both sessions, 
bringing much of the political debate with them. Khan notes that a number of ‘prominent 
Leaguers had gathered’ in Lahore to discuss the League’s approach to their claim: ‘The 
centre of political gravity was shifting from New Delhi to the offices and front rooms of 
clerks, petty officials, policemen and administrators’.21 The courtroom drama of the Partition 
hearings necessarily constructed the border in a particular set of ways in order to make the 
data and the territory legible. Critical work on other partition contexts can help to illuminate 
                                                 
19 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 108. 
20 Papers of Oskar Spate, MS 7886, 12, 6-1-1, National Library of Australia, Canberra. 
21 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 105. 
the courts’ difficulties in making sense of the volume, complexity and often contradictory 
nature of the raw data at hand. 
It is this process that transforms data into evidence. Eyal Weizman, for example, 
writes eloquently about the legal battles surrounding Israel’s separation wall, observing that 
during some of these trials, the use of a three-dimensional, scale topographic model of the 
wall and border regions in the courtroom ‘helped [the court] arrive at a verdict on the 
“behaviour” of the wall itself’.22 The model itself was ‘like a toy’, ‘an agent in the discussion’ 
that took place in the courtroom. The model simplified the spatial enormity and complexity 
of the wall—turned it into ‘a reduced world under control’.23 Weizman argues that the model 
‘both provided the object of debate and instigated the specific language with which this 
debate could take place’. The three-dimensional map of the wall became the means by which 
the wall came to be known and understood within the legal and juridical terms of the court; it 
‘generated the geographical grammar for “the law” to shape physical reality’.24 The process 
of negotiation, and the presentation of varying positions and viewpoints was, of course, 
crucial to the courtroom proceedings. ‘The route’s folds, stretches, wrinkles and bends 
plotted the relative force of different participants brought to bear on it by the different parties 
and the relative force of their arguments’.25  
In the Punjab in 1947, the putative border was in some ways constructed through a 
similar process of visual and oral presentation and argument. Beginning with a notional 
boundary line, published as part of the 3 June 1947 radio announcement, the proposed 
borders (all of which were modifications to the notional line) were presented on maps and in 
oral presentations to the justices of the Commission. The future border, to use Weizman’s 
                                                 
22 Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza 
(London/New York: Verso, 2012). 
23 Ibid., p. 72.  
24 Ibid., p. 73. 
25  Ibid., p. 77. 
words, was at once an object of debate and a means of creating a ‘geographical grammar’ for 
‘the law’ to re-shape physical reality. The courtroom itself, and the way it put the putative 
border and boundary-making practices on trial, so to speak, was integral to the way different 
elements of boundary-making were to be implemented. Oskar Spate recognised this when he 
wrote in his diary that the Muslim League’s original proposed boundary was perhaps most 
accurate in its representation of population and resource distribution, but would be too 
conservative as a starting point for courtroom bargaining. Spate encouraged the League to 
expand its claims, on the assumption that Radcliffe would employ compromises and trades in 
his final Award. The presentation of legal arguments by the various political parties and their 
representatives, bolstered by the use of cartographic and statistical evidence, created the 
conditions whereby three potential boundaries were considered and negotiated on: the 
notional boundary, the Muslim League line, and the Congress–Sikh line. As Weizman writes 
of the Israeli security wall: ‘It is in this context that the wall started appearing as a “political 
plastic”—a spatial product made and remade as political forces assume physical form, a 
diagram of the balance between the forces that shape it’.26 Similarly, the India–Pakistan 
border itself became a form of ‘political plastic’ within the courtroom, shaped and moulded 
by the meeting of competing claims and political forces in front of the Boundary 
Commission. 
The Battle of the Maps 
The partition process in the Punjab was both a cartographic and legal conundrum, where 
majority populations did not fit neatly along economic, political, religious or environmental 
lines. For Stephen B. Jones, the American boundary-making expert, technical aspects of 
boundary-making were of limited use when it came to dealing with this particular kind of 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
population issue, and he surmised that in particularly difficult situations population transfers 
might be the only solution.27 While he argued that population transfer should always be 
avoided if possible, he was unable to deal effectively with the technical impossibility of 
boundaries that were to be drawn along population lines, but which, due to historical, social 
and physical factors, were impossible to actually implement. In such cases, rather than 
finding an alternative to a single boundary, populations might have to be moved in order to 
make the reality on the ground match the legal reality depicted on the map.  
Maps from the Survey of India Office (Figure 1) show in great detail both the 
diversity of the population and the unity of the infrastructure in the Punjab, illustrating the 
myriad sacred sites and religious centres, rivers, canals and railways that connected and 
organised the province. The Punjab Boundary Commission faced the complex problem of 
how to divide what the British had spent nearly a century developing into a unified state.28 
The Punjab was the last region of India to be annexed by the British government and, since 
1849, had been subject to a number of large-scale colonial development projects, including 
an extensive canal system designed to increase the province’s agricultural productivity and an 
enlarged railway network. The canal system had contributed both to the growth of a unified 
system of waterways and to the reorganisation of the Punjabi population through the granting 
of land in newly-fertile regions in western regions of the province. Many Sikhs who had 
served in the First World War had taken advantage of government land grants after returning 
to the Punjab from Europe in 1919.29  
                                                 
27 Jones, Boundary-Making. 
28 Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004). 
29 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849–
1947 (New Delhi/Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2005). 
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 FIGURE 1. Map of the Punjab. The disputed central belt of the Punjab encompassed the Lahore 
Division (2) and the Jullundur Division (3). Source: Hunter et al., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 
26 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 34. 
Spate had a keen interest in railways as strategic entities—as conduits for movement, 
lines of military defence, and means of establishing border continuity.30 The Muslim League 
drew on Spate’s information to bolster its attempt to maximise access to resources via the 
railways and canal system. Canal headworks featured prominently in its arguments about 
territorial continuity; the Muslim League feared that having canal headworks in one country, 
while most of the water from the headworks flowed through the other country, could cause 
immense difficulties, especially given the population distribution of the Punjab.31 However 
                                                 
30 Sadullah, The Partition of the Punjab, 1947. 
31 Indeed, such concerns were well founded, because water disputes have remained a challenging issue 
for diplomacy in the subcontinent since Partition. Daniel Haines, ‘Disputed Rivers: Sovereignty, 
the question of canals—their headworks and courses—did not align with the mandate for 
partition which was based on majority areas. For example, Pathankot, a district in northern 
central Punjab bordering Kashmir and Gurdaspur was a contested area during the 
negotiations because the Madhopur headworks on the Ravi River were located there. 
Pathankot and most of Gurdaspur were awarded to India, while most of the Ravi River 
flowed through territory awarded to Pakistan. 
The colonial government of the Punjab had drawn and published some population 
maps before 1940; the most accurate and widely available to the researcher were those 
included in The Imperial Gazetteer of India Atlas volumes. It was in the context of the 
courtroom, as the delegations constructed and presented their arguments to the Boundary 
Commissions, that this colonial data (and the bordering mentalities it engendered), originally 
collected and disseminated for the purposes of colonial administration, were mobilised in 
new ways for the purpose of constructing the new boundary along international, rather than 
colonial, lines.  
The first edition of the Gazetteer to include an atlas volume was published in 1909, 
and was updated in 1931. Using maps drawn primarily by the Survey of India office, the 
atlases were prepared in Britain by John G. Bartholomew. These maps depicted in 
cartographic form much of the geographical information contained within the volumes of The 
Imperial Gazetteer of India. They presented geological and climate data; population data 
showing the breakdown of the Indian population based on such categories as race, religion 
and language (Figure 2); infrastructural and administrative data (including canal routes, 
railway lines, military divisions, and economic resources); and historical maps. All of this 
                                                 
Territory and State-Making in South Asia, 1948–1951’, in Geopolitics, Vol. 19, no. 3 (3 July 2014), 
pp. 632–55; and Amit Ranjan, ‘Disputed Waters: India, Pakistan and the Transboundary Rivers’, in 
Studies in Indian Politics, Vol. 4, no. 2 (1 December 2016), pp. 191–205. 
had been designed primarily to illustrate the expansion and consolidation of British power 
across the subcontinent. But in 1947 it serviced to expedite decolonisation. Critical 
cartography, which conceptualises maps not only in terms of the technical and practical 
aspects of their creation and application, but also in terms of the political and social 
conditions that underpin both the creation and the substantive form of the map, suggests that 
we might probe the possibilities and the limits of a single set of maps to see how it serves 
these two distinct purposes.32 While the colonial origin of the data may not have been a 
significant reason for the failure of Partition to stem communal violence, a post-colonial 
reading of the maps requires some consideration of the question. If the data itself both 
produces and is produced by colonial knowledge, as Cohn, Metcalfe, Edney, Appadurai, and 
others have argued in various ways, how effective can such data be in re-ordering the post-
colonial nation-state?33 
                                                 
32 J.B. Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, in Cartographica, Vol. 26, no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 1–20. 
33 Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Arjun Appadurai, ‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’, in C.A. 
Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds), Orientalism and the Post-Colonial Predicament 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj 
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 FIGURE 2: Map of Prevailing Religions. Source: Hunter et al., Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 26 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), p. 15. 
The sketch-maps, drawn by J.S. Cotton who had been Hunter’s assistant on the first 
editions of the Gazetteer, depict the ‘relative extent of British, Muhammadan, and Hindu 
power’ in India (Figure 3 and Figure 4).34 Shown in the customary imperial pink, the maps 
provide a cartographic representation of the historical story of British rule contained in the 
gazetteers which had, since the first publications of the Imperial Gazetteer in the 1880s, 
become the standard narrative of the development of ‘India’ for the British colonial 
government. They show British territory over the years and have become, in British 
historiography, the key moments in the territorial development of the Raj.35 They depict the 
shrinking territorial ownership of India by Indians, providing the visual-cartographic 
representation for narratives of both British legitimacy and authority, and of Indian claims to 
territory through a historical-geographical legacy of legitimate rule. 
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 FIGURE 3. Historical maps of India, 1765 and 1805. Source: Hunter et al, Imperial 
Gazetteer of India, Vol. 26 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), p. 28. 
 
 FIGURE 4. Historical maps of India 1837 and 1857. Source: Hunter et al, Imperial Gazetteer 
of India, Vol. 26 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), p. 29. 
 
Reading the maps of the 1947 Punjab Boundary Commission 
All of this historical cartographic analysis helpfully contextualises both the position and the 
limits of geographical data during the partition negotiations of July 1947. As noted at the end 
of the introduction, much of the geographical evidence put forward to the Boundary 
Commission actually muddied the waters because the maps were presented simultaneously 
(and in a somewhat contradictory manner) as political visions of the future territory of India, 
while at the same time representing a purportedly accurate cartographic representation of 
India at the time. While such evidence could have (and Spate was one of many to argue later 
that it should have) been more comprehensively applied, which would have resulted in a 
boundary that more closely resembled the Muslim League’s line, the framework of legal 
negotiation, judicial authority, and private backroom politicking contained and managed its 
influence. 
The Gazetteer maps shown above, as well as the other ethnographic and linguistic 
maps included in the same atlas volume, depicted the spatial distributions of the various 
social and racial categories that the British had identified among their subject Indian 
population. The immediate effect of such ethnographic mapping was the obfuscation of local 
difference and variation. Instead it emphasised territorial boundaries which reflected, in broad 
brushstrokes, the social boundaries that the British deemed salient to the political and cultural 
organisation of India. Nationalists appropriated and mobilised these colonial maps in a 
variety of competing ways, as Sumathi Ramaswamy has expertly demonstrated.36 
In 1940, when Jinnah said ‘we find that even according to the British map of India we 
occupy large parts of this country where the Mussalmans are in a majority, such as Bengal, 
Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind, and Baluchistan’,37 he was invoking the standardised and widely-
available cartographic images of colonial India, published in volumes like the Imperial 
Gazetteer, some of which have been reproduced above in Figures 2,3 and 4, to claim that not 
only was there a social division between Hindus and Muslims in India, but that it was 
reflected in a clearly visible spatial division as it had long been depicted on the ‘British map’. 
In his speech, later termed the Lahore Resolution, this ‘map’ (a composite colonial 
cartography) was used as justification for re-defining India’s Muslim population as a separate 
nation that was entitled to territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Congress mainstream 
mobilised the same map in service of a different narrative, refusing to divide Hindus and 
Muslims in such a territorialised way and preferring to read the map as a visual representation 
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of India’s ability to maintain both its political unity and its cultural diversity.38 The 
geographical data from which the maps were drawn did not necessarily support one narrative 
more clearly than another, and so the maps were put to work in the service of multiple, 
sometimes complementary, sometimes competitive, stories about India’s past, present and 
future. Recalling Weizman’s description of the putative border as a ‘political plastic’, these 
different narratives, drawn from the same cartographic material, shaped the border into 
multiple lines, existing simultaneously in the courthouse arena and as hypothetical futures. 
The problem of contiguity 
The Punjab Boundary Commission maps, and the arguments presented with them, provide an 
opportunity to examine just how differently the Indian nationalist parties understood the 
territory of the Punjab and its relationship to the rest of India and the future Pakistan. In these 
maps, the tensions between the affective rhetoric of religious nationalism, and the technical 
and economic realities of dividing territory, are clearly on display. They show how bordering 
imaginaries could be put to work in conflicting and competing ways by appealing to both 
scientific geographical knowledge and cultural and nationalist sentiments. After Partition, the 
border, now a legal line on a map and a boundary dividing the territory of the subcontinent, 
continued to function in similar ways, working both as a legal international boundary and as a 
mode of constructing new political (specifically national) identities in India and Pakistan. In 
her book The Long Partition, Zamindar traces the post-Partition development of Indian and 
Pakistani national citizenship through the use of passports, demonstrating how such 
bureaucratic state-centric activities contributed to the creation and enactment of new political 
identities.39 After Partition, places that had once been accessible to many no longer were 
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because movement across the new border suddenly rendered one either a citizen or a 
foreigner almost overnight. 
Both sides crafted official claims that emphasised ‘contiguous majority areas’, 
because the Commissions’ Terms of Reference centred on the issue. Contiguity presented a 
fundamental problem, however, both for the political parties and the Commission, and is a 
recurring theme in the Boundary Commission documents. Determining contiguity in 
geographical practice requires a qualitative or subjective decision based on thorough 
knowledge of the population in question. In constructing arguments that accounted for 
‘contiguity’, the parties before the Commission produced maps that depicted their desired 
boundaries in relation to contiguous populations on either side. But contiguity in the Punjab 
was difficult to determine because, as mentioned above (and as Manu Goswami has so 
carefully articulated), the colonial administration of the Punjab had constructed a singular 
unit bound together by administration, economy and infrastructure despite the diversity of the 
population. 
Unsurprisingly, each side claimed much of the same contested area in the central belt 
of the Punjab. The British government’s insistence on contiguity was a fascinating political 
application of a technical geographical concept. The Muslim League’s claim was based on 
majority areas calculated by taking the tehsil (administrative area) as unit. The League argued 
that one of the most important decisions facing the Boundary Commission was the selection 
of a consistent unit by which to measure majority and minority populations. The League was 
specifically concerned with issues around gerrymandering and the inaccurate visualisation of 
population data through suspect map-making techniques. Zafrullah Khan noted that without a 
standard unit, both sides could claim large tracts of territory where their populations were, in 
fact, a minority. He argued that the Congress had done just that with its ‘Red Map’ (analysed 
in greater detail below), saying: ‘I have tried to make it clear the Commission should adopt 
some standard, otherwise large areas on both sides can be claimed, as in fact on the other side 
they have been claimed, as majority areas which even a more cursory examination of the map 
would show were not majority areas of that particular community’.40 In arguing this point, 
Zafrullah Khan drew attention to the competing cartographic claims of the two sides, and 
called upon geographical authority to point to a perceived illegitimate claim made by the 
Congress delegation. In so doing, he also implied that the legal process had a responsibility to 
adjudicate based on geographical accuracy rather than on compromise or exchange, or on 
more subjective or emotionally-charged claims such as religious or cultural heritage or 
affective relationships to place. Yet these other types of claims were also a key part of the 
legal process which, while shaped in part by the geographical discourse and geographical 
evidence adduced, put such evidence into conversation (or competition) with those claims. 
It was therefore left to the justices and to Radcliffe to determine not just the 
geographical ‘fact’ of the matter, but its role in the overall effectiveness of the League’s legal 
argument, which was a different task from simply adjudicating on the relative accuracy of the 
maps. If the task was purely technical, to accurately map the population and then draw a 
boundary accordingly, then the process would not have required the convening of a Boundary 
Commission, the meeting of delegates in courtroom hearings, and the elaborate performance 
of a pseudo-legal exercise. Indeed, the process could have been done by a technical expert in 
the field. But because the process was in fact a set of highly-charged political negotiations as 
well as a pseudo-legal procedure in which a formal boundary would be drawn, the space and 
the performance of the courtroom provided a veneer of both legal legitimacy and British 
authority, as well as Indian involvement, as Yasmin Khan and Lucy Chester have argued.41 
‘A giant gerrymander’? 
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The Muslim League map (Figure 5) depicted the League claims to contiguity. In 
arguing for the tehsil as the standard unit by which the Boundary Commission should 
ascertain contiguous majority areas, Zafrullah Khan appealed to the administrative map that 
was already at work in the Punjab. He noted that by taking the tehsil as the standard unit, ‘at 
any particular moment of time it would not be difficult to ascertain either the boundaries of a 
tehsil or other data, population, and so on’. Tehsil boundaries were relatively consistent and, 
while they were redrawn occasionally, compared to other smaller units they were less ‘liable 
to alteration’.42 However, the League’s proposed line did not neatly follow the pre-existing 
borders of tehsils, because it believed that the contiguous Muslim majority extended partly 
into tehsils that had non-Muslim majorities. On the map, these areas are depicted by green 
horizontal lines, and include parts of the Fazilka and Muktsar tehsils, which were ‘in 
continuation of the Ferozepore tehsil’ which the League claimed as a Muslim-majority tehsil. 
The League argued that this was different from the Congress map, in that the portions that the 
League claimed in the Fazilka and Muktsar tehsils had significant Muslim majorities which 
were contiguous with the rest of the League’s claim. The Congress map, on the other hand, 
did not actually depict contiguity at all:  
There is no contiguity to a compact area there in the case of the other side. 
Take Batala tehsil. Bits are left out at one end, bits are left out in the middle 
and other bits are taken. There is this distinction between the areas claimed 
by the particular method adopted by the other side and the areas claimed by 
the method adopted by this side. The areas claimed by us are contiguous 
and compact and have a majority.43  
Zafrullah Khan argued, in other words, that the Congress and League claims to contiguity 
were based on fundamentally different methods of determining majority populations. Spate 
grasped this and viewed the Congress method as a gerrymander, in contrast to the League 
method which he deemed consistent with geographical methods for mapping population. The 
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League map also depicted the League claims to part of the Pathankot tehsil; this claim was 
based on the ‘other factors’ clause, and was an attempt to keep the canal system intact. The 
Madhopur headworks, which controlled the Upper Bari Doab canal, were located in 
Pathankot tehsil, while the areas irrigated by the Upper Bari Doab canal had been claimed by 
the League based on contiguity and Muslim majorities.  
 
FIGURE 5. The Muslim League Map. This map, submitted to the Punjab Boundary 
Commission, showed the League’s proposed line, Muslim-majority tehsils in green, a non-Muslim-
majority pocket in yellow, and non-Muslim-majority areas in white. ‘The Muslim League Map’, 
Papers of Oskar Spate, MS 7886, 6-1-1, National Library of Australia, Canberra. Permission for 
reproduction kindly granted by National Library of Australia. 
While the League case rested, for the most part, on contiguity, the Congress case 
attempted to use the ‘other factors’ clause in the Terms of Reference to illustrate the ways in 
which the Punjab was an interconnected economic, cultural and infrastructural unit, and thus 
to claim the majority of the province (and all of the contested regions). The maps actually 
depict this: the League map shows contiguous majority areas in green, which has the effect, 
of course, of erasing the presence of minorities on the map. The Congress map (Figure 6), on 
the other hand, attempts to cartographically depict a territorial connection between the non-
Muslim population of the Punjab (Hindus and Sikhs, specifically) and a narrative of Punjabi 
‘homogeneity’ and ‘unity’.44 Spate called the Congress map ‘a giant gerrymander’, arguing 
that it made a false geographical claim to contiguity. Even so, the logic of the ‘Red Map’ lay 
not in its geographical accuracy, but in its cartographic rendering of Congress arguments, 
which attempted to use the trappings of geographical authority in order to downplay the role 
of internal boundaries (and thus, the relevance of standard units for the purposes of creating a 
territorial partition) in differentiating areas and populations within the Punjab. The Congress 
case also highlighted the interconnectedness of the infrastructure, industry and heritage of the 
Punjab. 
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 FIGURE 6: The Congress ‘Red Map’. Source: Papers of Oskar Spate, MS 7886, 6-1-1’, National 
Library of Australia, Canberra. Permission for reproduction kindly granted by National Library of 
Australia. 
In one of the most illustrative examples of the Congress’ insistence on such unity, its 
representative in court made a sweeping claim for the entirety of the Amritsar and Gurdaspur 
districts based on physical and infrastructural unity rather than population: ‘the district of 
Gurdaspur, considering its physical features and the topography and its situation in reference 
to the canal scheme, is really one unit as it were with the Amritsar district…this division has 
been made for administrative purposes but in fact the districts are one homogeneous unit’.45 
And he went on: ‘You will also notice that these two districts, Amritsar and Gurdaspur, are 
united by very close trade relations…there is rail and road communication coming up from 
Lahore to Amritsar, then from Amritsar on to Gurdaspur district and vice versa, inter-linking 
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Kangra Valley and the district of Kangra itself with Amritsar and Lahore’.46 He expanded, 
arguing that Lahore should also be included in this ‘bloc’ due to its position within the same 
irrigation tract as Amritsar and Gurdaspur. He specifically referred to the Red Map to make 
the point: 
If you turn to the map, you will notice that the headworks of the Upper Bari 
Doab canal are situated at Madhopur. This canal irrigates parts of 
Gurdaspur, a large part of Amritsar and goes on to irrigate parts of the 
Lahore district as well. If that tract is taken as a whole, you will find it 
ranges from Pathankot and extends into Lahore district and is a non-
Muslim majority area and it is also contiguous. Taken as a whole, it starts 
from the Gurdaspur district, embraces about two-thirds of the Amritsar 
district and further includes more than half of the Lahore district. All this 
area is united by a very powerful factor, as it is irrigated by the same canal 
system.47 
Note to typesetter: please do not indent this sentenceImportantly, here the claimed area was 
described in generalised terms and did not follow any administrative units or pre-existing 
boundaries. It encompassed bits and pieces of each of the districts he claimed (‘two-thirds’, 
‘more than half’), thus providing a geographical and territorial justification for the ambitious 
Congress claim. The Congress narrative thus emphasised the arbitrariness of internal 
boundaries within the province and, in a somewhat contradictory way, appropriated an 
intentionally-vague geographical language to challenge the validity or usefulness of the 
geographical concept of contiguous majority populations as a basis for the partition of the 
province. This narrative was in turn supported by a map that purported to show the 
substantial presence of non-Muslims in many districts which were actually Muslim-majority 
areas. 
In more simple terms, both of the most powerful parties’ arguments relied on the 
trappings of geography in the development of their territorial claims: technical terms like 
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‘contiguity’ and concepts like ‘standard units’, as well as the geographical authority of the 
cartographic image, were inserted into the debate. The use of geographical terms and 
geographical imagery does not, however, make a sound geographical argument, and Spate 
and the League were not alone in decrying parts of the Congress case in the Punjab as lacking 
in geographical rigour. After Partition, Oskar Spate argued in a speech to the Royal 
Geographical Society in London in December 1947, that the award made in the Punjab was 
problematic in geographical terms because it ceded too much territory to India which should 
have gone to Pakistan. In Bengal, he argued, the opposite had been the case: too much had 
gone to Pakistan and not enough to India. In his position as an outside observer with expert 
knowledge in geography, he surmised that, had the awards been different, a less violent 
outcome had been a possibility.48  
Conclusion 
The scholarly criticism levelled at the Boundary Commissions, Radcliffe and Mountbatten 
has argued that they ignored the lessons of geographical knowledge and allowed the drawing 
of a boundary that defied geographical logic. However, such a claim belies the wider 
historical fact that geography’s scientific authority was contained and managed by the rules 
and function of the courtroom, in which geography became one of many kinds of knowledge 
put forward as evidence to be judged by those with the authority and wisdom to do so. 
Contemporary observers are certainly not wrong in their recent assertions that the process did 
not do enough to account for the geographical realities of the partitioned areas of the 
subcontinent. Yet the wider context of the historical geography of the time, as well as 
continued debates in geopolitics about the construction and maintenance of borders and 
boundaries, indicate that Partition in India and Pakistan was not uniquely affected by this 
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geographical ‘blind spot’. Indeed, conventional geographical wisdom, then and now, would 
say that a territorial partition along identity lines is always a dangerous proposition, as Spate 
cautioned more than once. But boundary commissions have never been purely geographical 
in purpose; they are, rather, political bodies formed to carry out the geopolitical will of 
empires and nation-states. 
Incorporating geographical knowledge into the wider Boundary Commission 
negotiations was at times a contradictory process, and was always shot through with political 
strategy. Geographical questions permeated the proceedings, but those proceedings were 
decidedly pseudo-legal both in practice and in theory, and geographical data was presented, 
interpreted and applied in legal terms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the evidence often functioned 
more as a political tool than as a foundation for an evidence-based boundary decision. Had 
the boundary been drawn in the traditional spaces of geographical practice (in the ‘field’, as it 
were, or in a mapmaker’s studio), geographical knowledge might have assumed a different, 
perhaps more authoritative role. But because such knowledge was brought into the 
courtroom, to be presented, dissected and ultimately judged by legal scholars and esteemed 
justices, the trappings of geographical authority (maps, surveys, studies of infrastructure and 
natural resources, agricultural and industry surveys) were themselves scrutinised by legal 
experts. Through the language of geographical authority, competing, contradictory and 
contentious claims to territory (in effect, competing visions of a boundary) were placed on 
trial, to be judged according to criteria that were designed to take some geographical 
concerns into account, but not to use geography as the sole basis for a final award. Even if the 
data presented to the Boundary Commissions had been more accurate and reliable, such data 
would not have alleviated the concerns (about political representation, sovereignty, security, 
resources) nor the claims (to territory, to history, to tradition) that formed the basis of the 
legal arguments made during the Punjab Boundary Commission hearings. Such a claim begs 
the question: why did the veneer of geographical authority prove so attractive not only to the 
nationalist delegations but also to Mountbatten and the nationalist leaders in their articulation 
of the Terms of Reference for the Boundary Commissions? The archive explored here 
provides only limited insight into this question, but it is key to unpacking the complexities of 
the relationship between the Punjab Boundary Commission and the practice of geography. 
 
